Adam Back Critiques Nic Carter’s Views on Bitcoin’s Quantum Computing Risks

Published 12/20/2025

Adam Back Critiques Nic Carter’s Views on Bitcoin’s Quantum Computing Risks

Adam Back Critiques Nic Carter’s Views on Bitcoin’s Quantum Computing Risks

The debate between Adam Back, CEO of Blockstream, and venture capitalist Nic Carter over Bitcoin’s vulnerability to quantum computing highlights fundamentally different assessments of the timeline and immediacy of the threat. While both acknowledge the theoretical risk quantum computers pose to Bitcoin’s cryptographic algorithms, their contrasting views underscore the challenges in forecasting technological progress and preparing a decentralized network for future security upgrades.

What happened

Adam Back publicly criticized Nic Carter’s more cautious stance on Bitcoin’s quantum computing risk, characterizing Carter’s concerns as “uninformed noise” that exaggerates the immediacy of the threat. Back argues that the development of quantum computers capable of breaking Bitcoin’s cryptography remains decades away, providing sufficient lead time for Bitcoin to adapt. This position aligns with assessments from independent quantum computing experts at IBM and Google, who note that although quantum supremacy has been demonstrated for specific computational problems, the scale and error correction required to compromise Bitcoin’s ECDSA and SHA-256 algorithms are not yet achievable.

Nic Carter, on the other hand, has warned that the timeline for quantum computers to threaten Bitcoin’s cryptographic security may be shorter than some industry optimists suggest. Carter emphasizes the difficulty of coordinating a network-wide upgrade to post-quantum cryptographic standards in Bitcoin’s decentralized governance structure, suggesting that underestimating the risk could leave the network vulnerable if preparations are not timely. Both agree on the theoretical vulnerability of Bitcoin’s current cryptographic schemes but diverge sharply on when this vulnerability will become practically exploitable.

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is actively working on standardizing post-quantum cryptographic algorithms designed to resist quantum attacks. This development supports Back’s view that Bitcoin could feasibly upgrade its cryptographic protocols before quantum computers become a practical threat. However, no official roadmap or timeline from Bitcoin Core developers currently exists to address quantum resistance implementation.

Why this matters

The debate highlights critical structural and security considerations for Bitcoin’s long-term viability. Bitcoin’s security fundamentally relies on cryptographic algorithms—ECDSA for digital signatures and SHA-256 for hashing—that quantum computers could theoretically break, undermining transaction integrity and ownership proofs. If quantum computers capable of this level of computation emerge unexpectedly soon, the decentralized and consensus-driven nature of Bitcoin could complicate swift adoption of new cryptographic standards, potentially exposing users and funds to risk.

Moreover, the discussion reflects broader challenges in forecasting technological breakthroughs and integrating emerging cryptographic research into widely used blockchain systems. The uncertainty around quantum timelines complicates risk management strategies for developers, investors, and regulators. Given that some Bitcoin addresses reuse keys or hold unspent outputs vulnerable during a transition period, the timing and coordination of upgrades are consequential for network security.

From a market perspective, the perception of quantum risk may influence stakeholder confidence and strategic planning, even if no quantum attacks have occurred. The ongoing NIST post-quantum cryptography standardization process represents a proactive measure to future-proof cryptographic systems, including blockchain protocols, reinforcing the importance of monitoring and eventually adopting these standards.

What remains unclear

Despite consensus on the theoretical vulnerability of Bitcoin’s cryptography to quantum attacks, the precise timeline for when quantum computers might realistically achieve this capability remains uncertain. Current quantum hardware is far from the scale and error correction required, but the pace of advancements is difficult to predict. This uncertainty leaves open questions about the urgency of upgrades.

Additionally, the feasibility and timing of implementing a Bitcoin protocol upgrade to post-quantum cryptography are unresolved. Bitcoin’s decentralized governance and consensus mechanisms pose inherent challenges to coordinated, network-wide changes, especially for fundamental cryptographic components. There is no public roadmap or formal disclosure from Bitcoin Core developers addressing how or when such an upgrade would occur.

Interim risks during any transition period also remain unclear. For example, coins associated with reused addresses or unspent outputs may be more vulnerable to quantum attacks before full adoption of new cryptographic standards. The performance, scalability, and compatibility of emerging quantum-resistant algorithms with existing blockchain infrastructure have yet to be empirically validated in a production environment.

Finally, empirical data benchmarking the quantum threat specifically to Bitcoin’s cryptography is lacking, as no real-world quantum attacks or test cases exist. This limits the ability to assess the practical impact of the quantum risk beyond theoretical and experimental projections.

What to watch next

  • Progress of NIST’s post-quantum cryptography standardization and the publication of finalized quantum-resistant algorithms suitable for blockchain integration.
  • Any formal statements or development roadmaps from Bitcoin Core or other key developers regarding quantum resistance upgrades.
  • Advancements in quantum computing hardware, particularly breakthroughs in error correction and qubit scaling relevant to breaking ECDSA and SHA-256.
  • Research and testing of post-quantum cryptographic algorithms in blockchain environments, focusing on scalability, security, and consensus compatibility.
  • Discussions within the Bitcoin community on governance and coordination mechanisms for implementing fundamental protocol changes in response to emerging quantum threats.

The disagreement between Adam Back and Nic Carter encapsulates the broader challenge of balancing caution with optimism in assessing quantum computing’s impact on Bitcoin. While the timeline and practical risks remain uncertain, ongoing research, standardization efforts, and community dialogue will be critical to ensuring Bitcoin’s resilience against future cryptographic threats.

Source: https://cointelegraph.com/news/quantum-computing-bitcoin-adam-back-nic-carter-debate?utm_source=rss_feed&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=rss_partner_inbound. This article is based on verified research material available at the time of writing. Where information is limited or unavailable, this is stated explicitly.